In early January 2026, Polish President Karol Nawrocki vetoed the bill implementing the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) in Poland. The legislation, passed by the Polish parliament, aimed to establish national mechanisms for addressing illegal content online, including procedures for blocking access to specific materials and administrative oversight of digital platforms. The president's decision was justified by a violation of constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, the right to a fair trial, and the principle of proportionality of state interference with individual rights.
The presidential veto did not apply to the DSA itself, as an EU regulation directly applicable in member states. The problem was its implementation in the Polish legal system. Indeed, the version submitted to the President for signature removed the automatic, immediate enforceability of administrative decisions, and judicial review was formally strengthened. However, this does not change the fact that the fundamental architecture of the act remained based on transferring the real power over access to content from the courts to public administration bodies.
Decisions to block or remove content were to be made administratively, and the court, although provided for in the procedure, was to play a corrective role, only being activated upon the request of an interested entity. In practice, this meant that the burden of defending freedom of speech was to be shifted from the state to the citizen or business owner. They must respond, file appeals, and bear the costs of the proceedings, while the administrative decision sets the starting point for the entire procedure.
From a constitutional perspective, this solution is questionable. Freedom of speech is not a concession granted by the government, but a principle that the state may only restrict in exceptional and strictly controlled ways. Even if judicial review formally exists, its effectiveness depends on speed, proportionality, and the real ability to prevent irreversible consequences. The President aptly noted that in public debate, time is of the essence; content blocked "temporarily" often disappears from circulation forever.
The problem, of course, is broader. Today, the internet constitutes a fundamental economic infrastructure, serving as a space for advertising, sales, information exchange, and reputation building. A regulatory model based on discretionary administrative decisions increases legal risk and reduces the predictability of the business environment. Entrepreneurs operating in sectors based on content, media, analysis, and expert commentary are placed in a situation of structural uncertainty.
Additional controversy surrounds the role of so-called trusted whistleblowers, who were granted special powers in the content reporting process by law, while simultaneously receiving public funding. Such a model poses a threat to the creation of a system of indirect control over public discourse, implemented by formally independent entities operating within the state's regulatory framework.
The presidential veto should therefore be interpreted not as an objection to combating online crime, but as a warning against the development of a system of administrative control of public discourse. Combating genuinely illegal content can and should occur within existing judicial mechanisms, not through expedited procedures that prioritize freedom as the exception rather than the rule.
If the DSA is to be implemented in Poland, it must be done in a manner consistent with the constitution and the logic of a free society. Otherwise, digital regulation will become another tool for expanding administrative power at the expense of civil and market freedoms. The president's veto halted this process, at least temporarily.
Source, Łukasz Wojdyga Director of the Center for Strategic Studies Warsaw Enterprise Institute mail: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
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